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The Misdirected Debate 
over the Economics of
Disabilities Accommodation
Seth D. Harris
U.S. Department of Labor
Vernon Briggs is an unabashed advocate for government regula-
tion of labor markets. Of course, his advocacy has focused primarily 
on immigration policy (Briggs 1996, 2003; Briggs and Moore 1994). 
Even if labor markets operate effi ciently, he has said, effi ciency is not 
the paramount value in American society. Fairness, equal employment 
opportunity, and the self-suffi ciency of working families are important 
values that deserve equal respect in debates over labor-market policies 
(Briggs 1984).
Yet Briggs’s arguments do not depend exclusively on a normative 
appeal. Consistent with his training in institutional economics, and his 
gentle-but-fi rm contrariness, Briggs stresses that labor markets do not 
always operate effi ciently. In such cases, he advocates conscientiously 
designed and properly implemented government intervention to im-
prove effi ciency (Briggs 2003). According to Briggs, labor regulation 
“forces managers to manage,” rather than to refl exively slash labor costs 
in search of competitive advantage (Briggs 1987). A central insight of 
Briggs’s scholarship is that regulation can redirect competition toward 
more productive and socially desirable outcomes.
This chapter applies Briggs’s insight to the economics of workplace 
accommodations mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). The ADA’s Title I prohibits employment discrimination against 
any “qualifi ed individual with a disability.”1 Along with discrimination’s 
more traditional forms,2 the ADA defi nes “discrimination” to include 
the failure to provide a “reasonable accommodation” to a worker with 
a known impairment as long as the employer will not suffer an “undue 
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hardship.” An accommodation can be any change to a physical environ-
ment, work schedule, or job responsibilities that allows a worker with 
a disability to perform the essential job functions or enjoy the same 
privileges and benefi ts as co-workers.
The ADA and its accommodation mandate have been criticized as 
government meddling in otherwise smoothly operating and effi cient 
labor markets. The attack begins with the premise that accommoda-
tions raise employers’ costs of hiring workers with disabilities. Critics 
argue the ADA’s accommodations mandate contributes to joblessness 
by pricing workers with disabilities out of the labor market. The result 
is a tempting man-bites-dog narrative about labor-market regulation 
harming its intended benefi ciaries. In fact, this is the reasoning behind 
at least two commentators’ calls for the ADA’s repeal (DeLeire 2000; 
Epstein 1992).
Briggs would skewer this type of argument if it were attempted in 
his scholarly arena. In this chapter, I follow his lead and respond in a 
similar manner. I will examine certain neoclassical economic assump-
tions and others that are too seriously fl awed to justify the central role 
they have played in the debate over disabilities accommodations. In 
essence, this debate began with the wrong premise and, as a result, ru-
minated over wrong conclusions. These fl awed premises have distracted 
attention from likelier causes of the low and declining employment rate 
among workers with disabilities—that is, the hypotheses that should 
have been the debate’s starting point. After reviewing how this de-
bate went wrong, I will suggest hypotheses that should have been, and 
should be, at the center of the debate over the economics of disabilities 
accommodations.3
THE ADA’S EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS 
WITH DISABILITIES
Virtually all statistical measures show that workers with disabilities 
are employed at a much lower rate than workers without disabilities,4 
and there is little debate over the decline in their employment rate since 
the ADA was enacted (Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba  forthcom-
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ing; Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003). Instead, the scholarly debate has 
focused on whether the ADA contributed to the employment rate’s de-
cline. From its earliest days, scholars and judges have predicted that the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate would make workers with disabilities 
more expensive to employ than workers without disabilities and, there-
fore, less appealing to employers (Barnard 1992; Borkowski v. Valley 
Central School District 1995; Calloway 1995; Donohue 1994; Epstein 
1992; Issacharoff and Nelson 2001; Kelman 1999, 2001; McGowan 
2000; Rosen 1991; Schwab and Willborn 2003; Vande Zande v. Wis-
consin Department of Administration 1995). This prediction has been 
central to the debate.
In particular, this prediction served as the basis for the hypotheses 
tested by two early and important studies fi nding a causal relation-
ship between the ADA’s passage and a decline in the employment rate. 
Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist (2001) and Thomas DeLeire 
(2000) studied data from the Current Population Survey and the Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation, respectively. Acemoglu and 
Angrist found a decline in the employment rate among both men and 
women with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 39 beginning in 
the two years immediately after the ADA took effect in 1992. DeLeire 
found a substantial decline in the employment rate of men with disabili-
ties beginning in 1990—immediately after the ADA was passed, but two 
years before it took effect. The proximity of the ADA’s passage and the 
employment-rate decline, and analyses which purported to exclude 
other potential causes for the decline, led Acemoglu and Angrist and 
DeLeire to infer a causal relationship between the law and the decline.
A simple syllogism supports these studies’ hypotheses. Workers 
with disabilities need accommodations while workers without disabili-
ties do not. Accommodations cost money; therefore, employing workers 
with disabilities costs more than employing workers without disabili-
ties. Rational employers seek to maximize profi ts, which, assuming 
capital is fi xed, result from a worker’s net productivity (i.e., produc-
tivity minus labor costs). Since workers with disabilities bear higher 
labor costs because of their accommodations, and the accommodations 
can be assumed to make these workers only as productive as their co-
workers without disabilities, workers with disabilities return lower net 
productivity to their employers. As a result, employers will not hire 
164   Harris
them. Only a short logical step is needed to conclude that the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate has caused the employment rate among work-
ers with disabilities to decline. I have called this the “rational-choice” 
view of the decline in the employment rate for workers with disabilities 
(Harris 2007a). It justifi es employers’ choices to eschew workers with 
disabilities as economically rational.
As with most simply stated economic assertions, the devil is in the 
details. I challenge two assumptions that are necessary to the rational-
choice view. For the purpose of focusing on these assumptions, I will 
accept that accommodations impose costs that cause the net productiv-
ity of workers with disabilities to be lower than that of workers without 
disabilities. Even when this premise is accepted, the key assumptions 
supporting the rational-choice view are seriously fl awed. Because of 
these fl aws, the rational-choice view can explain, at most, only a small 
fraction of circumstances in which employers might be asked to provide 
accommodations to a worker with a disability. Thus, it offers a shaky 
foundation for any scholar’s hypothesis regarding the employment rate 
for all workers with disabilities.
Competitive Markets and Perfect Information
The fi rst and most important assumption underlying the rational-
choice view is that workers’ accommodation requests and employers’ 
accommodation decisions occur in perfectly competitive labor mar-
kets (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Donohue 1994; Jolls 2000). In such 
markets, there are no transaction costs or other factors interfering with 
employers’ profi t-maximization calculations, and net productivity will 
drive the decision to hire workers without disabilities, rather than work-
ers with disabilities. Yet, perfectly competitive labor markets are not 
ubiquitous, if they exist at all.
Many incumbent employees bargain with their employers in an 
“internal labor market” characterized by barriers to competition. Only 
“external labor markets,” in which job applicants and prospective em-
ployers search for each other, are presumed to be freely competitive 
(Harris 2007a). Since internal labor markets are not perfectly com-
petitive, the rational-choice view cannot describe the effects of many 
incumbent employees’ accommodations. To the contrary, as demon-
strated by several empirical studies and my own internal labor-market 
Economics of Disability Accomodation   165
analysis, incumbent employees with disabilities do not necessarily re-
turn lower net productivity for their employers than employees without 
disabilities—in some cases, they yield more (Blanck 1997, forthcom-
ing; Harris 2007a; Hendricks et al. 2005; Schartz et al. 2006). Therefore, 
the prediction that accommodations will ordinarily price workers with 
disabilities out of internal labor markets is inaccurate. Thus, the rational-
choice view is not relevant to workers with disabilities in internal labor 
markets.
A presumed characteristic of competitive markets, including exter-
nal labor markets, is perfect information. Employers are assumed to 
know everything they need to know to make effi cient hiring decisions, 
including which workers have disabilities and what accommodations 
they require. Yet information about disabilities and accommodations 
may not fl ow freely. Workers who roll their wheelchairs or bring a ser-
vice animal into a job interview necessarily disclose their impairments. 
But most employers are not similarly alerted that a prospective em-
ployee has epilepsy, diabetes, HIV, vision or hearing limitations, mental 
disabilities, intellectual and learning disabilities, or other impairments. 
The ADA does not require job applicants to disclose their impairments 
and prohibits employers from requesting such information except in 
limited circumstances.5
Further, even when they know a worker has an impairment, 
employers may not always know whether an impairment requires 
accommodation. In some cases, it may be obvious. Workers in wheel-
chairs will very likely need ramps or elevators to access upper-level 
fl oors. In other cases, it is less obvious. For example, a worker with 
cerebral palsy may or may not need an accommodation depending upon 
factors that the employer may not be able to assess during a job inter-
view, even if the employer knows what those factors are. Only those 
workers who request an accommodation during the hiring process are 
effectively forced to disclose that they have an impairment requiring an 
accommodation.
Thus, workers may have impairments that are unknown to their 
prospective employers or, even if known, may not require accommoda-
tion. Changes in these workers’ employment rate cannot be blamed on 
the costs of their accommodations because, by defi nition, employers 
cannot factor those costs into their hiring decisions. The rational-choice 
view is not relevant to workers with hidden disabilities or workers who 
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do not need accommodation or whose need for accommodation is not 
apparent.
Many workers acquire impairments after they have been hired. 
Some suffer industrial accidents or illnesses, and others suffer injury or 
illness not related to work. Still others experience impairments that are 
the natural effects of aging or disease. There is substantial evidence that 
workers in these categories represent a large percentage of all work-
ers with disabilities. For example, incumbent employees, not applicants 
for jobs, bring a large majority of the ADA charges fi led with the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Schwab et al. forthcom-
ing). Also, in 2005, 1.2 million incumbent employees in the private 
sector suffered workplace illnesses or injuries requiring recuperation 
away from work beyond the day of the incident (Sengupta, Reno, and 
Burton 2007). Data drawn from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, 
a survey of Americans between the ages of 51 and 61, found that 36 
percent of people in that age range with work-limiting impairments 
acquired those impairments because of an accident, injury, or illness 
at work. Thirty-seven percent of Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) recipients in the same age group were disabled because of an 
accident, injury, or illness at work (Reville and Schoeni 2003–2004).
As in the case of job applicants with undisclosed impairments or 
impairments that do not clearly require accommodation, employers 
could not have made hiring decisions about workers with after-hiring 
impairments on the basis of accommodations costs. It would have been 
impossible for employers to know at the hiring stage which workers 
would need accommodations because of the onset of after-hiring im-
pairments. The rational-choice view is again irrelevant.
In sum, disabilities accommodations issues are not characterized 
by perfect information in a long list of circumstances. The rational-
choice view offers no insight into an employment-rate decline among 
workers whose disabilities are hidden at the time of hiring, whose pro-
spective employers do not know that their visible impairments require 
accommodation, or who develop their disabilities any time after hiring 
(Harris 2007a). For the rational-choice hypothesis to prove true, the 
employment-rate decline would have to be explained without consider-
ing these large groups of workers with disabilities.
It may well be possible to construct an effi ciency argument about 
the ADA’s accommodation mandate and workers with disabilities. The 
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argument would likely resemble the debate over statistical race and sex 
discrimination (Aigner and Cain 1977). Briefl y stated, employers may 
rationally prefer to hire workers without disabilities if assessing the net 
productivity of workers with disabilities is systematically more costly 
than assessing the net productivity of workers without disabilities. In 
the context of disabilities accommodations, the argument would likely 
depend on an assertion that the costs of determining whether and to 
what extent workers with disabilities need accommodations are great-
er than the costs of assessing the net productivity of workers without 
disabilities.
A full discussion of the statistical-discrimination argument is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but two preliminary insights are 
worth considering. First, as the debate over statistical race and sex 
discrimination has shown, these arguments do not invariably lead to 
the rational-choice view’s preferred conclusion; it is possible to en-
vision situations in which antidiscrimination policy yields greater 
economic effi ciency than a market shaped by statistical discrimination 
(Lundberg and Startz 1983; Schwab 1986). Second, like the rational-
choice view itself, a statistical-discrimination argument would be 
relevant only to those workers whose need for accommodation is 
known to their prospective employers at the hiring stage. In order 
for employers rationally to prefer low-transaction-cost workers over 
high-transaction-cost workers, employers must be able to categorize 
workers correctly. Workers with hidden disabilities would be mis-
classifi ed into the low-transaction-cost group, as would workers who 
acquire disabilities after hiring. Thus, at best, a completely successful 
statistical-discrimination argument would relate to a limited number of 
cases. Like the rational-choice perspective, the statistical-discrimination 
argument has nothing to say about workers with hidden disabilities, 
workers with visible impairments but hidden accommodation needs, 
and workers who develop impairments after being hired.
In any event, the syllogism that has dominated the debate over the 
economics of disabilities accommodation was not built on statistical-
discrimination arguments. It relied instead on an assumption of per-
fect information. Eliminating this assumption necessarily makes the 
rational-choice view irrelevant to the employment prospects of large 
numbers of workers with disabilities. The next section discusses ad-
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ditional workers with disabilities whose employment status cannot be 
described by the rational-choice view.
Assuming Workers with Disabilities Would Be Employed 
without Accommodations
A second assumption underlying the rational-choice view is that 
workers with disabilities would have found jobs if the ADA did not 
mandate reasonable accommodations. If there were a causal relation-
ship between the costs of accommodations and employers’ decisions 
not to hire workers with disabilities, then it would also have to be true 
that the employment rate among workers with disabilities would have 
remained fl at or increased in the absence of the accommodation man-
date.6 In other words, some workers with disabilities must have been 
able to get jobs in the absence of the accommodation mandate but then 
unable to get them once the accommodation mandate took effect. This 
assumption is the essential stepping-stone from the premise that ac-
commodations bear positive costs and the hypothesis that the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate caused disemployment effects. It is also 
deeply problematic, as a straightforward thought exercise focused on 
the ADA’s text will disclose.
The ADA’s defi nition of the class of workers it protects—“qualifi ed 
individual with a disability”—illustrates why this causal link is unlikely 
in a large set of cases. A “qualifi ed individual” is a worker who, with or 
without accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the job 
she holds or desires. However, in its defi nition of “discrimination,” the 
ADA makes clear that employers are not merely obligated to accom-
modate workers so that they can perform the essential functions of their 
jobs. Employers must also accommodate workers so that they can enjoy 
the privileges and benefi ts of their workplace. Thus, the ADA protects 
three classes of workers with a disability:
Group 1—workers who can perform the essential functions of their 
jobs without accommodation and do not need accommodation to enjoy 
the privileges and benefi ts of their workplace;
Group 2—workers who can perform the essential functions of their 
jobs only with accommodation; and
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Group 3—workers who can perform the essential functions of 
their jobs without accommodation but need accommodation to enjoy 
the privileges and benefi ts of their workplace.
The question is: Which of these workers might have gotten jobs in a 
world without an ADA accommodation mandate but could not get jobs 
in a world with one?
The ADA’s accommodation mandate should not have affected hir-
ing decisions about workers in Group 1. Since neoclassical economics 
assumes that the productivity of workers hired in external labor markets 
is fungible, Group 1’s members should have been able to offer prospec-
tive employers the same net productivity as workers without disabilities. 
Without any need for accommodation, their labor costs would be the 
same. The cost of hiring these workers should not have increased—and, 
therefore, their net productivity would not decrease—as a result of the 
accommodation mandate. Thus, both before and after the ADA’s man-
date took effect, Group 1’s members should have been employed at the 
same rate as workers without disabilities, and the rational-choice view 
cannot explain any change in these workers’ employment rate.
The ADA’s accommodation mandate also likely had no effect on 
the employment rate of Group 2’s members, but for the opposite rea-
son. These workers would not have secured their jobs in the absence 
of the ADA’s accommodation mandate because they could not perform 
their jobs’ essential functions without accommodation. Simply, they 
were unqualifi ed absent accommodations and the law would not have 
required employers to hire them.7 By contrast, the accommodation man-
date made employment possible for this group at the same time it raised 
the costs of hiring them. Thus, at worst, the accommodation mandate 
cannot have had a disemployment effect for these workers, and at best, 
it may have boosted their employment prospects.
Proponents of the rational-choice view might argue that the ADA 
changed these workers’ job-match expectations. Workers with disabili-
ties might have applied for jobs that they would not have otherwise 
sought because the prospect of accommodations made these jobs ei-
ther possible or more desirable. One illustration of this effect might be 
a worker with a chronic back injury who would not have applied for 
a job that entails handling heavy packages absent an accommodation 
mandate. The existence of an accommodation mandate creates a possi-
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bility that the employer would provide a mechanical lift, which, in turn, 
might encourage that worker with a back injury to apply. If so, then 
the argument would be that the accommodation (here, the mechanical 
lift) would make the worker with a back injury more expensive to hire 
than a worker without a back injury. Thus, the worker with the back 
injury would not win the job in a competition with workers without 
disabilities.
Even if evidence of this kind of change in job-search behavior were 
found, it would offer only tepid support for the rational-choice view. 
There is no reason to believe that Group 2’s failure to secure these newly 
available jobs would cause them to abandon the labor market in a world 
with an accommodation mandate. Yet, a decline in their employment 
rate depends upon just that response. More likely, these workers would 
remain in the labor market and seek out jobs they could perform with-
out accommodations, just as they would in the absence of the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate.
If such workers remained in the labor market, then the most that 
can be said is that workers with disabilities who were inspired to seek 
new types of jobs by the ADA’s accommodation mandate might have 
suffered longer spells of unemployment due to a larger number of un-
successful job searches. Thus, the likeliest effect would have been a 
modest decline in the employment rate for some period of time after the 
ADA’s effective date followed by a fl attening out or a rebound to the 
pre-ADA employment rate over time. The decline would result from 
the longer unemployment spells, and the rebound would result from 
workers with disabilities learning from their experiences and applying 
for jobs that they could perform without accommodations. Yet, studies 
of the employment rate do not show a shallow dip in the employment 
rate after the ADA followed by a rebound in the following years. They 
show a steady decline after the ADA became law (Acemoglu and An-
grist 2001; Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba forthcoming; DeLeire 
2000).
Group 3 may contain the only individuals whose employment pros-
pects can be explained by the rational-choice view. Similar to Group 1’s 
members, workers in this group would have been able to perform the 
essential functions of their jobs without accommodation in the absence 
of the ADA and, therefore, would have been able to offer prospective 
employers the same net productivity as workers without disabilities 
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both before and after the ADA became law. Yet, we must assume that 
Group 3’s members saw their labor costs increase and their net pro-
ductivity decrease because their employers were required to provide 
non-productivity-related workplace privileges and benefi ts. Thus, the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate might have caused profi t-maximizing 
employers to prefer workers without disabilities to workers in Group 3, 
but not to workers in Group 1 or Group 2. In other words, the rational-
choice view might explain a decline in Group 3’s employment rate but 
not the employment rates of the other two groups.
Disclosing the fl aws in these two assumptions shows that the num-
ber of workers with disabilities whose employment prospects might be 
explained by the rational-choice view is quite small. At most, it might 
explain changes in the employment rate of 1) workers who were in the 
external labor market, had impairments at the time of hiring, and those 
impairments and the workers’ needs for accommodation were known to 
their prospective employers, and 2) workers who could perform the es-
sential functions of their jobs without accommodation but who need an 
accommodation to enjoy the privileges and benefi ts of their workplace. 
In both cases, the prospective employers considering hiring these work-
ers must then also have been able to assess accurately these workers’ 
need for these kinds of accommodations. Simply describing these limi-
tations illustrates the very narrow arena in which the rational-choice 
view might operate. It is too thin a reed to support the hypothesis that 
the ADA’s accommodations mandate caused a decline in the employ-
ment rate of all workers with disabilities.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINING
EMPLOYMENT RATE OF WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES
If the rational-choice view is not the likeliest explanation for the 
employment-rate decline among workers with disabilities, what might 
have been a better hypothesis with which to begin the debate over work-
place disabilities accommodations? Answering this question requires 
the pursuit of two different paths. The fi rst path starts with the premise 
that the results of the Acemoglu and Angrist and DeLeire studies are ac-
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curate—that is, these studies captured a statistically signifi cant decline 
in the employment rate for working-age people with disabilities associ-
ated with the ADA’s passage or effective date. Recent studies have also 
found a decline in the employment rate that is roughly proximate to 
the ADA’s effective date (such as Donohue et al. forthcoming), so this 
premise should be taken seriously. Pursuing this path requires look-
ing beyond the ADA’s accommodation mandate for causes that might 
explain the association between the ADA’s passage and the employment-
rate decline that followed.
The second path begins with the premise that any decline in the 
employment rate among workers with disabilities was not associated 
with the ADA. Rather, this path assumes that Acemoglu and Angrist, 
DeLeire, and others examined only one segment of a long-term decline 
in the employment rate that is unrelated to the ADA. Several critiques 
of the Acemoglu and Angrist and DeLeire studies have raised doubts 
about the accuracy of their results, so this premise may also be legiti-
mate (Bound and Waidmann 2000; Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba 
forthcoming; Kruse and Schur 2003). If so, then pursuing this path re-
quires fi nding explanations for a long-term employment-rate decline 
that is unrelated to the ADA’s accommodation mandate. In the follow-
ing sections, each path will be pursued to its logical conclusion.
Path 1: Assuming the Employment-Rate Decline Was Associated 
with the ADA
In 2004, Christine Jolls and J.J. Prescott produced a landmark study 
of the ADA’s effects on the employment rate of working-age Americans 
with disabilities (Jolls and Prescott 2004). The study disaggregated the 
effects of the ADA’s prohibition of traditional forms of discrimination 
from its accommodation mandate. It compared the post-ADA em-
ployment rate in states that had pre-ADA employment discrimination 
regimes that both prohibited the traditional forms of discrimination and 
mandated accommodations (ADA-like states) with 1) states lacking 
any pre-ADA disability anti-discrimination laws (no protection states) 
and 2) states prohibiting the traditional forms of discrimination without 
mandating accommodations (no accommodation mandate states). Thus, 
in “no protection” states, all of the ADA’s protections for workers with 
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disabilities were an innovation, and in “no accommodation mandate” 
states, only the ADA’s accommodation mandate was an innovation.
Looking at the years immediately following the ADA’s passage, 
Jolls and Prescott found that the employment rate for workers with 
disabilities in the “no accommodation mandate” states was 10 percent 
lower than in the group of “ADA-like” states. They found no compara-
ble gap between the “ADA-like” and “no protection” groupings. These 
results led Jolls and Prescott to conclude that the ADA’s accommoda-
tion mandate, but not the prohibitions on traditional discrimination, had 
caused a short-term decline in the employment rate for workers with 
disabilities (Jolls and Prescott 2004).
The Jolls and Prescott study does not, however, support the 
rational-choice view. The rational-choice view would have suggested a 
steady disemployment effect, not the short-term decline found by these 
scholars. Jolls and Prescott suggest that accommodations costs “may 
well have been exaggerated or particularly salient in employers’ minds 
just after the ADA’s enactment.” Contrary to the rational-choice view’s 
assumption of rationality, employers may have reacted irrationally to 
the perceived costs of accommodations (Jolls and Prescott 2004).
My own analysis of survey responses by participants in the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) mediation pro-
gram (i.e., workers alleging discrimination and their employers) lends 
some support to Jolls and Prescott’s explanation for the employment-
rate decline (Harris 2007b). The responses suggest that mediators faced 
additional barriers when assisting employers and employees who were 
negotiating over disabilities accommodations as compared with negoti-
ations over any other employment discrimination issue, including other 
types of disabilities discrimination charges. One of those added barriers 
was employers’ apparent bias against workers’ disabilities accommoda-
tions charges. When asked to remedy other allegations of employment 
discrimination, including other types of disabilities discrimination, 
employers agreed to solutions proposed in negotiations that were “real-
istic.” In negotiations over accommodations, however, employers were 
less able or willing to consider new information and new proposals 
that would lead to settlement. As a result, employers were less likely 
to agree to an accommodation even if they considered it “realistic.” 
This evidence suggests that employers voluntarily participating in the 
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EEOC’s mediation program systematically doubted the legitimacy of 
workers’ requests for disabilities accommodations, regardless of their 
merits.
In sum, even assuming some relationship between the ADA’s enact-
ment and an employment-rate decline for workers with disabilities, the 
rational-choice view does not necessarily offer the strongest hypoth-
esis explaining this association. Instead, there is evidence supporting 
a hypothesis that employers’ irrational response to accommodating 
workers with disabilities contributed to, or even caused, any post-ADA 
employment-rate decline. Of course, anti-discrimination statutes like 
the ADA are intended to protect against just this kind of irrationality. 
There may be enforcement problems with the ADA, but there does not 
appear to be a conceptual problem.
The irrationality hypothesis has another important advantage over 
the rational-choice view: it is relevant beyond a narrow group of work-
ers. Employers’ negative reaction to workplace accommodations could 
easily have affected workers in any labor market with any kind of 
impairment regardless of whether an accommodation was actually re-
quired. It would not have been bound by the ADA’s scope and the state 
of employers’ knowledge. Thus, an irrationality hypothesis may well 
have been a better starting place than the rational-choice view for the 
debate over the economics of disabilities accommodations.
Path 2: Assuming the Employment-Rate Decline Was Not 
Associated with the ADA
There has been substantial criticism of the research methods em-
ployed in the studies of both DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist. Early 
critics argued that the studies did not look beyond the ADA’s accommo-
dations mandate so as to properly exclude other possible (even likely) 
causes of the employment-rate decline among workers with disabilities 
(Bound and Waidmann 2000; Kruse and Schur 2003). These criticisms 
would not apply to Jolls and Prescott’s cross-state comparison, however 
(Jolls and Prescott 2004). Any factor with national reach that Acemoglu 
and Angrist or DeLeire might not have considered fully would have af-
fected employment rates in all states, not merely in “no accommodation 
mandate” states where Jolls and Prescott found an employment-rate de-
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cline. Any critique of the work of Acemoglu and Angrist or DeLeire 
must also take Jolls and Prescott’s study into account.
A recent study revisited the data set used by Acemoglu and Angrist 
(Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba forthcoming). Burkhauser and his 
colleagues raised questions about the work of Acemoglu and Angrist 
that may also extend to Jolls and Prescott’s results. First, they reconsid-
ered the population of workers studied. Acemoglu and Angrist studied 
working-age people who answered “yes” to the following question on 
the March Current Population Survey in any of the years from 1988 to 
1997: “Does [respondent] have a health problem or a disability which 
prevents him/her from working or which limits the kind or amount 
of work he/she can do?” (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). Burkhauser, 
Houtenville, and Rovba (forthcoming) considered only those workers 
who answered “yes” in at least two consecutive years; that is, the work-
ers that were the likeliest to be protected by the ADA. This change 
eliminated Acemoglu and Angrist’s evidence of a sharp post-ADA 
employment-rate decline. While Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba 
did not also revisit the Jolls and Prescott (2004) study, the pair’s data 
addressed the same group of workers considered by Acemoglu and An-
grist. Thus, like Acemoglu and Angrist, Jolls and Prescott’s results may 
also be too sensitive to the defi nition of “disability” to capture a genuine 
relationship between the ADA’s accommodation mandate and the em-
ployment-rate decline.
Second, Burkhauser and his coauthors expanded the time horizon 
studied to encompass pre-ADA business cycles. They found equivalent 
employment-rate declines during earlier economic slumps. Economic 
recession, not the ADA’s passage, might have explained Acemoglu and 
Angrist’s post-ADA employment-rate decline. Burkhauser and his co-
authors conclude that the employment rate among working-age people 
with disabilities began its decline long before the ADA became law 
and lasted long after. Thus, other hypotheses about the causes of the 
employment rate’s decline—hypotheses unrelated to the ADA—should 
be considered.
They posit that the declining employment rate among working-
age people with disabilities is associated with increased reliance on 
SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI provides cash 
support to people with substantial work histories who have serious or 
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deadly impairments and cannot engage in “substantial gainful activ-
ity” in the national economy.8 People with disabilities or blindness who 
do not have substantial work histories receive SSI benefi ts.9 Studying 
the households of men with disabilities, Burkhauser, Houtenville, and 
Rovba found that earnings have represented a declining portion of 
household incomes over the past 24 years, while SSDI and SSI benefi ts 
have represented a growing portion.
One explanation for this increasing reliance on SSDI and SSI is 
that these programs’ eligibility standards were relaxed in the mid 1980s 
(Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba forthcoming). More readily ac-
cessible SSDI and SSI benefi ts infl uence more workers’ reservation 
wages. Workers with disabilities can be expected to choose SSDI or 
SSI benefi ts over work when the value of those benefi ts, discounted by 
the transaction costs associated with obtaining the benefi ts, exceeds the 
workers’ likely wages. Yet, SSDI and SSI benefi ts are low: $981.40 per 
month on average for SSDI benefi ciaries in November 2007 and only 
$519.90 per month on average for working-age SSI benefi ciaries in 
January 2009 (U.S. Social Security Administration 2007, 2009). These 
cash benefi ts alone cannot explain the large number of workers with 
disabilities who have left the labor market.
Three other factors may have also played a contributing role: an 
educational-attainment gap between workers with and without disabili-
ties, the unavailability and inadequacy of employer-provided health 
insurance, and workplace and labor-market discrimination.
Educational attainment 
Workers’ educational attainment affects both their wages and their 
employment levels. In 2005, workers with high-school diplomas had 
an 80 percent higher unemployment rate than workers with bachelor’s 
degrees. The unemployment rate for workers without high-school diplo-
mas was nearly triple that of workers with bachelor’s degrees. Further, 
in 2005, workers with bachelor’s degrees earned 61 percent more than 
workers with high-school diplomas. Workers with bachelor’s degrees 
earned more than double the amount earned by workers without high-
school diplomas (U.S. Department of Labor 2008).
Adults with disabilities have less education than adults without dis-
abilities. In 2005, adults with disabilities were more than twice as likely 
Economics of Disability Accomodation   177
as adults without disabilities to have less than a high-school degree. 
High-school dropout rates among Americans aged 16–24 and students 
with disabilities have both declined; however, in 2006–2007, 10 percent 
of students without disabilities dropped out of high school compared 
with 15 percent of students with disabilities (Individuals with Disabili-
ties Act 2007; National Center for Education Statistics 2009).10 Further, 
adults with disabilities were only one-third as likely as adults without 
disabilities to have at least a bachelor’s degree (Rehabilitation Research 
and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics 2007).
Students with disabilities are less likely than their counterparts with-
out disabilities to enroll in some form of postsecondary education. They 
are signifi cantly less likely to enroll in a four-year program rather than 
a two-year degree program and less likely to graduate with a bachelor’s 
or associate’s degree (Horn, Bertold, and Bobbitt 1999). Although few 
workers with disabilities have bachelor’s degrees, those with degrees 
have generally comparable employment rates and salaries to those of 
baccalaureates without disabilities, and they enrolled in graduate school 
at similar rates, at least within the fi rst year after earning a bachelor’s 
degree (Horn, Bertold, and Bobbitt 1999). Nonetheless, because of this 
educational attainment gap, workers with disabilities were more likely 
to be unemployed and more likely to compete for jobs with wages at 
or around the level of SSDI benefi ts. Simply put, less education means 
higher unemployment, lower wages, and a greater incentive to seek 
SSDI benefi ts.
This educational attainment gap is not new, but its importance may 
have increased as the American economy has demanded ever-higher lev-
els of education from workers.11 Educational attainment among workers 
with disabilities has not kept pace with these demands. As a result, it 
is possible that workers with disabilities have become less employable, 
as a group, over the past two decades. If so, the educational attainment 
gap and the growing importance of education in the American economy 
might help to explain the continuing decline in the employment rate for 
workers with disabilities.
Discrimination
As Jolls and others have observed, workers who are likely to suffer 
discrimination in the labor market face lower returns to their human 
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capital investments and, as a result, are likely to pursue less education 
(Donohue and Heckman 1991; Jolls 2004). Jolls suggested that work-
ers with disabilities might have exited the labor market to increase their 
investments in human capital after the ADA promised an end to dis-
crimination (Jolls 2004). Yet, it is not clear that this is what happened. 
In fact, there is evidence that some workers with disabilities faced ris-
ing discrimination. Instead of choosing labor-market participation over 
education, such workers may have pursued a third option—leaving the 
labor market to join the SSDI rolls.
The Supreme Court drastically narrowed the scope of the ADA’s 
coverage beginning in the late 1990s. As a result, large numbers of 
workers with disabilities were left without protection against workplace 
or labor-market discrimination (Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 1999; 
Murphy v. United Parcel Service 1999; Sutton v. United Airlines 1999; 
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams 2002; Trustees of the University of Ala-
bama v. Garrett 2001). Without the ADA’s protections, workers with 
disabilities might have rationally opted for the certainty of SSDI and 
SSI rather than a discriminatory competition they could not win. Those 
who chose to compete likely did not invest adequately in education 
because it would yield returns more likely to be unnaturally suppressed 
by discrimination. In turn, their low level of education likely resulted in 
worse labor-market outcomes. This rising risk of unremedied discrim-
ination and its effects on both labor-market participation and human 
capital acquisition may also help explain the continuing employment 
rate decline among working-age people with disabilities.
Health care 
For adults with disabilities, the absence of health insurance can mean 
irrevocable physical and mental health deterioration. Many people with 
disabilities need regular care and supervision of their condition by doc-
tors and specialists. Without health insurance, they must pay for these 
services out of pocket and, as a result, might forego or delay the medical 
care they need (Williams et al. 2004). Yet, the crumbling employer-
provided health insurance system does not provide workers with dis-
abilities adequate relief from this risk. Forty-fi ve million Americans 
had no health insurance in 2007 (Denvas-Walt, Proctor, and Lee 2008). 
The number of employees with employer-provided insurance in 2007 
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has only increased by less than a thousand since 1999 (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2008), and the percentage of employers providing insurance has 
remained at about 60 percent since 2004 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
Health Research and Educational Trust, and Center for Studying Health 
System Change 2008, p. 6). Meanwhile, the cost of health insurance to 
workers has risen substantially: for example, the employee’s share of 
a family premium has doubled since 2000, averaging $3,354 in 2008 
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2008, p. 15).
Workers often lack health insurance because they have lost a job or 
changed jobs (Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance 2004). 
The COBRA system, which allows some laid-off workers to buy into 
their former employers’ health-insurance plans, has proven to be too 
limited and too expensive.12 Furthermore, employees with disabilities 
who fi nd their jobs transformed from full time with benefi ts to part time 
without benefi ts get no protection from COBRA. Even those with in-
surance may not have adequate benefi ts. Workers with disabilities are 
more likely to need specialized health care and to have chronic medical 
conditions requiring more services, such as frequent doctor’s visits or 
hospitalizations, and larger amounts of prescription drugs. Yet private 
health insurance plans are structured around providing insurance to 
relatively healthy people and, as a result, do not take into account the 
needs of people with disabilities (Crowley and Elias 2003).
By contrast, SSDI and SSI benefi ciaries are entitled to Medicare or 
Medicaid, respectively.13 These programs also typically provide more 
comprehensive coverage than private insurance. Adults with disabilities 
therefore have a substantial reason to seek and continue receiving SSDI 
or SSI benefi ts—comprehensive health insurance that cannot be lost or 
taken away as long as the benefi ciary’s status is maintained. Thus, the 
spreading entropy in the employer-provided health-insurance system, 
perhaps combined with the increasing importance of the education-
attainment gap and declining protections against discrimination, may 
offer the best explanation for the continuing decline in the employment 
rate (among working-age people with disabilities) and the associated 
rise in SSDI and SSI recipiency rates. 
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REDIRECTING THE DEBATE
In this chapter, I have argued that the debate over the economics of 
workplace disabilities accommodation began with mistaken premises, 
which misdirected the debate away from consideration of the likeliest 
causes of the low and declining employment rate among people with 
disabilities. In an effort to move the debate back onto the right track, I 
attempted to unmask the faulty assumptions skewing the current debate 
and proposed alternative explanations for the problems workers with 
disabilities encounter in the labor market. I offer these arguments in 
tribute to my teacher and friend Vernon Briggs, who challenged me to 
question orthodoxies in pursuit of progressive goals. My sincere hope 
is that this chapter does justice to the example he set.
Notes
1. 42 United States Code §12111(8) (2000) defi nes a qualifi ed individual with a 
disability as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires.”
2. In the lexicon of employment discrimination lawyers, the traditional forms of 
discrimination divide into two categories, “disparate treatment” and “disparate im-
pact.” Disparate treatment arises when “the employer simply treats some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.” Disparate impact involves “employment practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly on one group 
than another and cannot be justifi ed by business” (International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States 1977).
3. I wish to thank Marisa Baldaccini, Leanne Hamovich, Maria Ingravallo, Damien 
Maree, Marcelo Martinez, and Michelle Tonelli for diligent and helpful research 
assistance with this chapter. In addition, Melissa Stevenson’s assistance was al-
ways essential. Nonetheless, all errors are mine. New York Law School’s generous 
support of my research made this project and many others possible.
4. In 2007, the American Community Survey found employment rates for working-
age people with and without disabilities of 36.9 percent and 79.7 percent, respec-
tively. The Survey of Income and Program Participation found that 45 percent of 
working-age people with “severe disabilities” were employed in 2002, compared 
with 97.7 percent of working-age people without disabilities. The Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (BLS) published employment and unemployment rates for workers 
with a “disability” from the Current Population Survey for the fi rst time in March 
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2009. In February 2009, the employment-to-population ratio for workers with a 
disability was 19.8 percent while the ratio for workers without a disability was 
64.8 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2009). Although the levels vary, the dif-
ferentials are roughly consistent across statistical measures.
5. 42 United States Code § 12112(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2000) states that, with the excep-
tion of certain circumstances, an employer or hiring “entity” covered by the act 
“shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to 
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or sever-
ity of such disability . . . [However, a] covered entity may make pre-employment 
inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.”
6. This statement applies equally to a fl at employment rate or a rising employment 
rate because the population of working-age people with disabilities has grown; 
therefore, maintaining a steady employment rate means that workers with disabili-
ties are acquiring a larger absolute number of jobs. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, in 1995, 10.1 percent of people aged 16–64 had a work disability. In 2006, 
the percentage rose to 10.4 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 1995–2006).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (6) (2000) states that employers may use qualifi cation stan-
dards to “screen out . . . individuals” as long as they are “shown to be job-related 
for the position in question and are consistent with business necessity.”
8. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d) (1) (A) (2000) states that “The term ‘disability’ means—in-
ability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment.”
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a) (3) (B) states that under Title XVI, Supplemental Security 
Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, one who is disabled and eligible for 
SSI benefi ts is one who is “unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work.”
10. These data describe students who received IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act) services. Virtually all students with disabilities receive IDEA ser-
vices, so these data are a reasonable proxy for all students with disabilities. In 
2006–2007, 675,170 IDEA students exited high school, 100,831 of which were 
dropouts (Individuals with Disabilities Act 2007; National Center for Education 
Statistics 2009).
11. The BLS projected in 1996–1997 that 9 of the 20 fastest growing occupations 
between 1994 and 2005 would require an associate’s degree or more education, 
while BLS projected in 2008–2009 that 12 of the 20 fastest growing occupations 
between 2006 and 2016 would require an associate’s degree or more education 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1996–1997, 2008–2009).
12. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1161-1168, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300BB-1 to 300bb-1 (2000).
13. SSDI benefi ciaries are eligible for Medicare beginning 24 months after they begin 
receiving their benefi ts; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000). SSI benefi ciaries are a 
“mandatory eligibility group” for Medicaid—that is, states are “required to pro-
vide them with health insurance under the Medicaid program” 42 CFR 435.120 
(2006).
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